Abstract: Hundreds of foreign engineers worked in the vast lands of the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth to the earlyt wentieth century. These engineers and the works they carried out are worth exploring from the perspective of the circulation of expertsinaglobal context.Acloser look at the patterns of their employment contributes to developing abetter understanding of the formation of engineering as ap rofession in the Ottoman context.Thisa rticle studies the motives of foreign engineers for moving to the Ottoman lands, the projects they were involved in, theirc ountries of origin and their relationships with local engineers. We arguet hat the presenceo ff oreign engineers in the Ottoman lands was beneficial to all parties involved. Foreign engineers obtained prestigious jobs and brought with them access to ak ind of expertise that distinguished them from their less mobile colleagues. The Ottoman Empire in turn benefited from their work and expertise at manyd ifferent levels of administration, in publicw orks, in upgrading infrastructure and in education.
Foreignershad served Ottoman sultans since the earlyyears of the Empire. There was nothing exceptional in that; anyone whose skills werec onsidered useful could establish ar elationship of personal loyalty with the sovereign, independentlyofhis or her origins.This does not mean that being part of aspecific ethnic or religious group was of no importance. While being non-Muslim could be abarrier to accessing manyposts and ranks (particularlyinthe armed forces), certain groups weren evertheless associated with desirable knowledge and skills,a nd their members weres ought after and their servicesp rized for that reason.
In the eighteenthcentury, the idea thatEurope (Avrupa)was gainingimportant advantageo vert he Ottomans in specific strategic areas-such as arts and sciences linked to warfare (e. g., military drills, artillery,f ortification, shipbuilding and cartography)-gained ground among the Ottoman ruling elites.Thishad major repercussions for the practice of employing foreigners.P eople coming from European countries became associatedw ith this superior knowledge and skills, and weret hus offered advantageous conditions of service. At the same time, the notion of European superiority in terms of knowledge and skills was becomingdeeplyrooted in the minds of the Europeans themselves, which made them more self-confident,m ore demanding and less willing to fullys hift their allegiance and sense of belongingf rom aE uropean sovereign and country to the Ottoman ruler and lands. These trends subsequentlys haped patterns of recruitment and of service (Ágoston 2005;A ksan 2002;K açar 1996) .
As in the past,f oreign individuals,i ncludingt echnicians and military experts, continued to offer their skills to the sultan-sometimes moved by the need to seek refuge from ad angerous situation they faced in their own country, or from shameful personal circumstances. In these cases, conversions to Islam weres till common for those who wished to integrate into the Ottoman military structures-although since the Hungarian baron Ferenc Tóth (François de Tott) undertook ap artial reform of Ottoman military training in the 1770s, manyf oreign experts werec ommissioned to carry out military and naval tasks without the requirement of conversion. Thistrend was further strengthened when official inter-governmental collaboration was established between France and the Ottoman Empire, and Louis XVIsent several groups of expert officers and craftsmen to improvethe performance of the Ottoman navy and armies by introducing new shipbuildingtechniques,reshaping and enhancing military education and training,and innovations in weapon production, artilleryand fortifications. This collaboration continued under the French revolutionary governmentand, later,several other countries followed France'se xample and put their experts at the sultan'sd isposal (Kaçar 1996; F irges2 014) . In their turn, the Ottoman rulers (as well as theirh ighlya utonomous Egyptian vassals) began to send students, apprenticesand experts of all ethno-religious origins to foreign-mostly European-schools, workshops and military establishments, as did Ottoman families. Ottoman Christian elites (particularlyt he Greeks,a nd some Jewish groupsmainlyt hose with ties to Italian lands) had always sent their sons to European universities, but by the second half of the nineteenth century,this practice was being adopted by Ottomans of all ethno-religious groups.Several sons of powerful Ottoman pashaswereeducated in prestigious engineering schools in Europe and went on to actuallyw ork as engineers:t his was the caseo fM ehmed Refik, Yusuf Razi and Kamuran Sırrı.
Employing foreign experts viai ntergovernmental collaboration had important advantages, the most significant being that,unlike in the case of individual 'fortune-seekers'-who tendedt oe xaggerate their knowledge and skills, or to fashion themselvesa se xperts in strategic fieldsd espite their limited experience-the expertise of the mens ent by foreign governments was guaranteed. Among the disadvantagesofthis practice was the fact that these foreign experts gave detailed reports on Ottoman military issues (includingm aps of strategic places and plans of fortifications) to their governments-and their missions weres ometimes abruptly interrupted when their country switched its alliances and/or entered in war with the Ottoman Empire. Thist ype of intergovernmental collaboration continued until the end of the Ottoman Empire (and beyond): high-ranking officials of the French corps of ponts et chaussées engineers were employed as technical advisors at the Ottoman ministry of Public Works; officers of the British Royal Navy served in the Ottoman Navy for manyy ears; and German and Austrian officers not onlyt rainedO ttoman officers and advised Ottoman officials, but even came to command Ottoman troops (Martykánová 2016 (Martykánová -2017 S oydemir 2007; O rtaylı 1981) .S ometimes, the nationals of small states wereexplicitlypreferred, such as when Belgian general Henri Alexis Brialmont was commissioned in 1892b yO ttoman imperial authorities to draft plans for an improvement of the fortifications of the Straits (Alloul2 017, pp. 21-22).
Occasionally, foreign engineers might have found themselvesinthe midst of highlydelicate political issues. Their tasks could createaconflict of political and economic interests involving different parties, including their own countries.Between 1845a nd 1858, the regiono fM ount Lebanon experienceds evere political turmoil. The region'ssocial structuresbegan to dissolve due to multi-directional struggles, includingethnic and religious conflicts,center versus provincerivalry, and inter-communal struggles and tensions between feudal lords and villagers. In addition to the Ottoman administration, France, the British Empire, Austria, Russia and Prussia werea ctively involved in the region. The Ottoman government had been searchingfor solutions to stabilize the region,toprovide security for its people and alsotocollect taxes by negotiating with local forces and their 'protector' countries.Inthese circumstances, with the expectation of solving political problems, the government created ac ommission to make ac adastral surveyofthe regionthat would lead to amoreequitable distributionoftaxes among subjects. TwoPrussian engineers wereappointed to carry out acadastral survey of the region. Nonetheless,d ifferent actors and groups who did not agree with the project or with the wayi tw as supposed to be carried out fiercelyo pposed the engineers' presencei nt he region. Even the Prussian consul was annoyed with the Ottoman government for placing Prussian subjects under the command of the Ottoman governor,and he made his discomfort clear to the engineers.The Ottoman authorities made an effort to minimize these tensions by appointing local men to escortt he Prussian surveyors while they werem aking their reconnaissance. In spiteofthese measures, the livesofthe two foreign engineers were threatened manyt imes duringt he course of their duty (Farah 2000,p p. 477-487) .
With the growingintegration of the Ottoman Empire into the European concert of powers,and increasingcontacts between the sultan'ssubjects on the one hand, and nationals of different European countries on the otherhand, the Otto-mans often took the initiative and recruited skilled persons themselves. Such an initiative playedapivotal role in the story of the Polish engineer 'Vankovitch', recorded by British Armyi ntelligence officer Fred Burnaby (1842 Burnaby ( -1885 . This Pole,who was to become ac hief engineer in several provinces of the Ottoman Empire, was most probablyT eodor Wańkowicz, born in 1846 into aP olish noble family from ar egion near Minsk in today'sB elarus, and also known as Teodor Bej(Bey). Wańkowicz, who was asubject of the tsar of Russia,graduated as am ilitary engineer from the Military Collegeo fS t. Petersburg. When the Polish insurrection against Russianr ule (the JanuaryU prising of 1863 -1864) had broken out,h ej oined the rebels. He fought against Russia as ac ommander of ag roup of insurgents. Aftert he revolt was suppressed, Wańkowicz escaped and, after at roublesome journey,h ef ound himself in Istanbul,p enniless. To make his own living,h es tarted to work on the construction of roads.The engineer who supervised the work noticed that Wańkowicz knew as much about road-building as did he himself. Thus, he promoted him to assistant-engineer. His skills took Wańkowicz (or Teodor Bey) to provinces such as Yanya(Ioannina) in the Ottoman Balkans,and Yozgat in Asia Minor, whereheworked in the service of the Ottoman state as ac hief engineer of the province ( Burnaby 1877, pp. 185 -186; K onstantynowicz 2013) .
In turn, foreign engineers spottedand trained local talented men. During his employmenta sc hief engineer at the Ottoman Imperial Arsenal, aB ritish engineer named Shanks was assisted by local mechanical engineer Ahmed Besim. After Shanks'sresignation from the post,Ahmed Besim was appointed as his replacement (Tekeli / İlkin 2010,p.143) . Émile Lacoine, aF rench engineer who enjoyed al ong and fruitful professional career in the Ottoman administration of Postsand Telegraphs,set his eyes on the young Salih Zeki, atalented technician who had been educated in the Darüşşafaka-as tate-funded school for orphans that was known for its good technical and scientific curriculum. Lacoine arranged for Salih Zeki to be sent to studyinFrance and, after he returned to Constantinople, the youngman went on to have aremarkable career as amathematician,i ncludingt eachingp osts at prestigious state schools (Günergun2 005, pp.117-118).
The government or particularinstitutions sometimes asked the Ottoman embassy in as pecific country to contact and recruit experts thatw eren eeded. In other cases, the Ottomans who (had)l ived, studied or travelled abroad, approached the candidates and proposed to them the idea of workingi nt he Empire, be it for the government,f or ap ublic institution or for ap rivate company. Thus, for example, when the above-mentioned Ottoman electrical engineer Mehmed Refik, who had studied in the Institute de Montefiore in Liège, became director of the Civil Engineering School (Hendese-i Mülkiye Mektebi,later Mühen-dis Mektebi), he recruited Belgian engineers to teach in this Ottoman public institution (Akbaş 2007 (Akbaş -2008 .
Personalr ecommendations and networkingproved to be an important force shapingi ndividual professional trajectories,a nd an efficient means of recruitment.T he Austrian engineer and expert in hydraulics Philipp Forchheimer o btainedh is diploma in engineering at the Technical Hochschule of Zürich in Switzerland and receivedhis Habilitation in the Prussian city of Aachen. In 1874,h ew orked on the construction of the railwayf rom Rakovník to Protivíni nB ohemia, which was then part of the AustrianE mpire. We do not know how exactlyh ec ame to teach the 'scienceso fP ublic Works' at the Civil EngineeringSchool in Constantinople in 1891-1892, but he soon returned to Aachen as ap rofessor and subsequentlyt aughta tt he Technical Hochschule of Graz, where he became arector in 1896/7.In1913,hewas back in Constantinople: the Ottoman authorities appointed him a dersnazırı,ordirector in charge of the lectures (academicdirector)ofthe School of Engineers (Mühendis Mektebi); that is, the reformedCivil Engineering School wherehehad taught morethan twenty years before.Besides his administrativetasks, he lectured on hydraulics, canals, bridgesa nd similar subjects. Forchheimer'sm otivations for his professional involvementi nt he Ottoman Empire are unknown, but we know that,a tl east according to his Ottoman students and colleagues, he felt comfortable in Constantinople and had ag ood relationship with local staff and students. Moreover,h e might have been attracted by the opportunitytopursue his interest in Byzantine hydraulics and architecture: he is an author,together with the art historian Josef Strzygowski (later infamous for his Nazi activism), of the book Die Byzantinischen Wasserbehälter von Konstantinopel,p ublishedi nV ienna in 1893, soon after Forchheimer returned from his first teachinge ngagement in the Ottoman Empire (Kozeny1 961, pp. 295 -296;Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften 1957,p .3 36; U luçay/Kartekin 1958) .
During the Great War, when Austria and the Ottoman Empire werea llies, Forchheimerc ontacted another Austrian engineer,K arl Terzaghi, and asked him to join him. Terzaghi, born in 1883i nP rague, had studied at the Technical Hochschule of Graz-the school whereForchheimer had taught and served as rector.Terzaghi accepted Forchheimer'soffer,probablyusing it as an opportunity to escape the meat-grinder of the Great War. In 1915,h eb ecame ap rofessor of the 'tolerance of railwayi nstruments' and of the 'principles of civil engineering' at the School of Engineers in Constantinople, training some of the members of what was to become the first generation of civil engineers of the Turkish Repub-lic.¹ In the following decades, this youngman was to become afamous engineer who worked and taught on severalc ontinents (he became al ecturera tH arvard Universityi n1 938), and is considered the father of soil mechanics (Goodman 1999) . Terzaghi'smentor Philipp Forchheimer did not seek talent onlyinEurope, though.During his appointment as academicdirector at the School of Engineers, he recruited an Ottoman Muslim, Salih Murad (who latera dopted the surname Uzdilek), who taught at the Ottoman NavalA cademy, to teach physics to his engineering students( Uluçay/Kartekin 1958).
As we have alreadyo bserved in the case of Teodor Wańkowicz, the willingness of Ottoman authorities to grant exile to refugees from European countries had collateral benefits for Ottoman engineering.I ns uch cases, the Ottomans did not have to go and seek skilled men in Europe; these experts came to the sultan'sd omains on their own, thirstingf or an opportunity to earn their living by making use of their expert knowledge and skills. There were several major waveso fr efugees in the long nineteenth century thatb rought in useful expertise, the first of which was linked to the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and the Restoration of absolutist regimes.T he partition of Poland and the uprisingst hat followed from time to time throughout the following century also created several refugeew aves, as did the revolutionary wave of 1848 and the struggle for Italian unification. Italians,Poles and Hungarians came in noteworthyn umbers and wereo ftenw illing to fullyc ommit to the Ottoman Empire and become Ottoman subjects. This was the case, for instance, of aP olish engineer called Franciszek Sokulski, who was ad istinguishedm ember of the Polish émigrécommunity that gathered and organized themselvesinthe early1850s in the city of Shumla in the Ottoman Balkans.Realizing that he had little chance of returningb ack to his homeland, Sokulski decided to permanentlys ettle in the Ottoman Empire. Apparently, he discussed this issue with Omar (or Ömer) Pasha (1806 -1871), ah igh-ranking and successful Ottoman military man who was himself of Serbian origin, born as Mihajlo Latas in an OrthodoxC hristian familyi nt he Austrian Empire-though in his case, his exile to the Ottoman lands (and subsequent conversion to Islam)w as motivated by embezzlement charges, rather than by the sort of noble political reasons thatm ost probably caused the flight of Franciszek Sokulski. Omar Pasha encouraged Sokulski to applyt ot he Ottoman grand vizier for aj ob as ac ivil (ponts-et-chaussées)e ngineer,b uilding roads in the Ottoman provinces of the Balkan Peninsula. It  The term 'civil engineer' is highlyp olysemic. In this article, we do not use it in the way ingé-nieur civil is generallyu sed in Frencht od enote an engineer workingi nt he privates ector,b ut rather in the sense of the Turkish inşaat mühendisi,the French ingénieur de ponts-et-chaussées or the Spanish ingeniero de caminos.
seems that he finallyachievedh is aim and was even able to retire-still aC atholic-with as tate pension, as an engineer of ac onvincingly similar name appears in Ottoman documentsduringthe several following decades (Martykánová 2010,p.169) . In this context,i ti sn os urprise that theirO ttoman peers and students cherishedt he memory of these exiles, particularlyo ft he Poles.² Unlike their French, Britisho rG erman colleagues, these engineers did not benefit from the backing of ag reat power with strategic interests in the Ottoman lands, nor had they their nationalc ompanies operating in the Ottoman Empire and willingt os ystematicallyd iscriminate in their favor.
In most cases, foreign engineers in the service of the sultan werebetter paid than their local counterparts. Their term of employment was extended annually, or for longer periods if the agreement proved mutuallybeneficial.The expansion and consolidation of the administrative apparatus in charge of public works broadened and stabilized the career opportunities for both Ottoman and foreign engineers,asthere existed no principle of national exclusivity thatwould establish Ottoman nationality as ar equirement for all Ottoman public employees. Thus, for example, Italian engineer LuigiStorari was commissioned by the Ottoman government to work on specific tasks in different cities of the Empire, and ended up appointed to ap ermanent post as as pecialist in cartographya nd measurements in the DirectionofBuildings(ebniye idaresi)ofthe newly founded municipal governmento fI stanbul.³ However,the extension of service over decades might not have been so advantageous for foreign engineers,b ecause in comparison to al ocal citizen it was often more difficult for foreign subjects to obtain the right to ar etirement pension from the Ottoman government.T hus, for instance, Britishengineer Frederick Taylor worked in various industrial facilities of the state from 1833 on, onlytobecome unemployed after 23 years of service and denied ar etirementp ension (Özbay/Bülbül 2009,p .2 
09).
One should not suppose that all initiativest oe mploy engineers came from officials of the central government.The central administration receiveddemands for engineers from almostall regions of the Empire. Those engineers weresought for major and minor projects in cities, towns and villages. Forthe period between 1854/55a nd 1864/65, we have identified ninety-five projects for which engineers werer equested in provinces and towns.I nf act,t he real number mayb em uch higher,asour analysis was limited to the documents included in the online catalogue of the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives. These engineers wereemployed in short-term works,upon completion of which they were immediatelyemployed in another task. In caseofanemergency,engineers could even be taken away from their posts and sentt oa nother region of the Empire, leaving their current work unfinished. The existenceand frequency of such demands pointstothe growing consolidation of the figure of the engineer in the social imagination of the ruling elites.The need for technical expertise was becomingwidelyacknowledged, and the social legitimacy of engineers expandedd rastically. In this context,t he authorities were in desperate need of experts: they tried to tackle this need by employing both Ottoman and foreign engineers.
Forexample, for the period between 1854/55and 1864/65, we have identified at least 47 foreign engineers who werea ppointed by the Ottoman authorities to work on different civilp rojects,i ns tate institutions, or for provincial and local administrations. Bearing in mind that this number does not includeall of the foreign engineers who worked in the Empire at that time, we mayn evertheless affirm thatt hese engineers came mainlyf rom Great Britain, France, Austria and Italian states.B esides other tasks, they weree mployed mainlyf or the construction of roads,the installation of telegraph lines, for mining,the construction of railways and for other tasks (includingt he amelioration of rivers, lakes and marshes, map-making,the construction of ports, docks and lighthouses,the refurbishingo fu rban areas destroyed by fire,t he construction of buildings,e tc.). The conditions of their employment varied from temporallylimited contracts to a full integration into the Ottoman administration.
The growingp resenceo ff oreigners-be they recruited individuallyo rv ia inter-governmental collaboration-at all levels of the Ottoman administration shaped and molded bureaucratic practice.O ne of the most obvious manifestations of the impact of their presencewas that French became one of the languages of official communication, along with Ottoman Turkish. Manyinstitutions, bureaus and departments, as well as territorial administration schemes, were inspired by European institutions and arrangements-but rarelyw eret hey an exact copy of af oreign model. Rather,f oreign expertsa nd Ottomans who had become acquainted with specific foreign establishments and practices,p roposed, created and implementedi nstitutions and arrangementst hatr esembled what they knew from abroad, but included ad hoc adaptations to local circumstances and solutions to specific challenges, and often integratedlocal administrative and institutional traditions and routines. Foreign experts-even the most powerful and influential ones-could not create, reform and redesign the Otto-man military forces and institutions of governmentattheir whim; they had to get support and funding from Ottoman dignitaries and keep it long enough for their innovations and reforms to take root.C ase studies show that creatingw orking relationships and alliances with their local peers, includingimmediate superiors as well as junior colleagues or students, was often the most efficient wayfor foreign experts to ensure that their projects would survive long after their initial contribution.
Besides being recruited by governments and public institutions, foreign technicians wereo ften sentb yf oreign companies to the Ottoman domains together with new technology (machines, iron bridges), or hired by thosec ompanies to build ap articular element of infrastructure(port works,r ailways)i nt he Ottoman lands. These practicesm ultiplied after the Crimean War, when an unprecedented number of European foreigners from all social classes arrivedinOttoman landst hroughout the nineteenth century.B ritish documents concerning foreign affairs recorded that 66 Britishe ngineers werew orkingi nİ stanbul in 1886,w hile the total number of British subjects residingi nt he city was 640. That is, more than 10 %o fB ritishr esidents weree ngineers,e ngineering being the most frequentlyr egistered profession among the local British population (Kocabaşoğlu 2004,pp. 170 -171) . The number of French engineers residinginIstanbul in 1906 -1907w as close to 30.Thisf igure includes engineers who were workinginIstanbul or its hinterland, as well as those who worked as managers at the headquarters of several French private companies.These numbers, however,a re far tool ow to realisticallyc onstitutet he total number of French engineers workinga ll around the Empire (Giraud2 002, pp. 25-27).⁴ Engineering and business activities further expanded and diversified from the 1880s on, during the so-called First Erao fG lobalization ( 1880 -1913) , which implied massive penetration of foreign capital into the Empire and direct European intervention into Ottoman affairs, includingt he establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881, following the sovereign default of 1875 (Pamuk 1987; Thobie 1977; G eyikdağı 2011) . Foreign engineers socialized with their fellow countrymen resident in the Ottoman lands, but also with their colleagues-foreign and local engineers and architects, be they Christian, Muslim or Jewish. After the YoungT urk Revolution (1908), freedom of press and associationvastly expandedt he opportunities for professional activism and foreign engineers did not lag behind their Ottoman colleagues in taking part in the process. Together  Forinstance, while therewas onlyone French engineer from the miningcompany Société Hér-aclée residing in Istanbul (he was the general manager) in the above-mentioned statistics,t he number of foreign field engineers working in Zonguldak was five.
with their Ottoman (mainlynon-Muslim) peers, foreign engineers and architects of various nationalities co-founded and joined the Associationd es architects et ingénieursenTurquie (1913 -1914) , in which,asthe press stated, "Ottomans,Germans, French, Austrians, Italians, Swiss, Egyptian(s) and English fraternise under the presidency of Mr.J oseph Aznavour,a rchitect" (GCO 1914, pp. 45 -48) . In fact,the statutes of this professional society clearlyacknowledged the keyr ole foreign experts playedi nO ttoman engineeringa nd architecture, stating that its council was to be composed of twoA rmenians,t wo Greeks, two Jews, two Turks, and two of all other Ottoman ethno-religious groups,a nd that seven weretobeforeigners of different nationalities. Moreover,several journals werep ublished in Constantinople to which foreign engineers actively contributed, includingt he above-mentioned Association'sj ournal Génie Civil Ottoman,t he Revue Technique d'Orient and the trilingual German-French-Ottoman Zeitschrift fürT echnik und Industrie in der Türkei (publishedd uringt he Great War, in 1916 War, in -1917 .
Vast Ottoman territories werea lsol ands of opportunityconcerning the renovation and expansion of communications and infrastructures,a nd theira daptation to the latest technologies. This stimulatedforeign presenceinmanyways; the engineering projects themselvesw erea ppetizing investments for foreign companies,w hilst simultaneouslyc ontributing to European countries having more economic and political control of the territory.Foreign companies,local entrepreneurs, the Ottoman government and regional authorities all engaged in an unprecedented level of building activity.O ttoman government officials had an undecided attitude towards infrastructural construction projects.O nt he one hand, they understood them as means to economic prosperity and to ab etter control of the territory,a swell as symbols of what they understood as the progress of civilization-an inevitable process resulting from humankind'sstriving for perfection, in which, however,noc ountry or group had ag uaranteed place and in which an active effort had to be made to participate, and to avoid the danger of falling victim to stagnation or decline.Onthe otherhand, Ottoman statesmen werew ell aware of potential risks and liabilities,s uch as providinge asy access for foreign armies, or investmentsbeing shaped by foreign rather than Ottoman interests. Furthermore,publicinvestment in separatist regions could be lost once these became independent.
Besides the clashing strategic interests of local elites,O ttoman authorities and foreign governments, the rivalry among foreign companies/investors over infrastructure projects wasu navoidable, even in cases of relatively minor works. The construction of the quayo fİ zmir is an example of such rivalry between the Britishand the French. Although the quaywas originallyaproject of the British settled in İzmir,t he companyt hey founded, Smyrna QuayC ompany, could not overcome financial difficulties to execute the project.So, the Dussaudbrothers, French engineers,b ought the companya nd completed the quayi n1 880.I t was as uccess among projects of its kind, for its scale and modernity (Frangakis-Syrett 2001) . French companies doing business in Ottoman lands made use of French and foreign engineers who had graduated from French engineering schools. Thus, for instance, Joseph Volayfrom Lyon, who had receivedhis diploma at the prestigious École centrale des arts et manufactures in 1897, worked as a railwaye ngineer in China, the Ottoman Empire (at the Soma-Bandırma railway that employed several centraliens of this generation), Spain, Cuba, Syria and France, before becoming( by 1920)t he engineer-in-chief of the Régie général de chemin de fer et travaux publics in Beirut.C airo-born Eugène Girard, who had graduated from the sames chool in 1899,w orked as assistant-engineer of the chief engineer at the construction of the Homs-Tripoli (in Ottoman Syria) and the Soma-Bandırma (in Asia Minor)r ailwayl ines. Another centralien, Félix Courras (grad.1880), born in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, worked in Ottoman Syria for the Compagnie des chemins de fer de Beyrouth-Damas-Hauran et Biredjik sur l'Euphrate in 1897( Annuaire des anciens 1920).
While European economic domination grew exponentially, this was also a period of collaboration, joint ventures and multinational teams of workers and experts, cooperatingt oc arry out projects of unprecedented nature, size and complexity.F oreign engineers not onlyadvised Ottoman ministers and other officials of central, provincial and municipal administrations, and taught Ottoman studentsa nd trainedl ocal apprentices-they also worked in ministerial departments sideb ys ide with Ottoman Armenian and Muslim technicians, managed companies owned by Ottoman Jews and Greeks,a nd founded joint enterprises and applied for concessions with their Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim colleagues. Fori nstance, another French centralien,É mile Foucart (grad. 1879), began his professional career in af amilyb usiness, Maison Joly et Foucart,m achinebuilders and producers of ceramic products. By 1897, however,hewas the manager of ac eramics factory in Karaagaç near Constantinople, an establishment owned by the Camondof amily, Ottoman Jewish bankers and entrepreneurs who had moved to Paris in the late 1860s, while they continued to run several businesses in the Ottoman Empire (Annuairedes anciens 1897). Foreign and Ottoman engineers worked togethero nt he construction of the Hejaz Railway-the emblematic public works project and propagandao peration of Abdülhamid II'sr eign, and the first Ottoman railwayo nw hich Muslim engineers who had graduated from Ottoman engineering schools worked in significant numbers (Gülsoy 1994) .
The multitude of examples of efficient collaboration did not prevent asense of rivalry.Asmentioned above, foreign engineers wereoften offered much better contracts and salaries thantheir local counterparts, who werewella ware of this and, particularlyafter the Young Turk Revolution, felt free to complain. Europeans' knowledge and skills were often taken for granted. It is true, however,that towards the end of the Empire, Ottoman public institutions began to check the engineers' credentials and let them applyo nlyf or posts that werec onsidered suitable for their level of qualification, or adapted theirs alaries accordingly.⁵ Managers of foreign companies tended to seek expert technicians among their fellow-countrymen and among other Europeans,t hough there was ag rowing trend to hire Ottoman subjects who had studied abroad-particularlyt he nonMuslims among them.
There werea dvantagesi ne mploying locals, not onlya se xpert technicians, but alsoa se xecutive managers:t hey knew better how to negotiate with the different levels of Ottoman administration, they had useful contacts and they were better at handling local workers than the often arrogant foreign engineers,who expectedo bedience and wereu naware of important and potentiallyd angerous power dynamics on the construction sites-particularlyi nr ural areas wherev illagers weree mployed in the framework of as cheme designed in the mid-nineteenth century,a ccordingt ow hich villagers paid their taxes by workingi n mines, or buildinga nd maintaining public works (Martykánová 2010,p .1 48; Atayman 1984) . Nonetheless, particularlyO ttoman Muslim engineers who graduated from Ottoman schools complained bitterly of heavy discrimination, as foreign companies proved extremelyr eluctant to hire them, even for posts below their qualifications (Uluçay/Kartekin 1958, p. 583) .
Public institutions did not always do better in this respect,preferringtoimport outstanding-and expensive-foreign expertsf or as pecific project,r ather than train and employ local technicians, be they Muslim, Armenian, Jewisho r Orthodox (Martykánová 2014) . On the otherhand,the posts of military engineers weres taffed exclusivelybyM uslims, and non-Muslims had very limited options to access the 'technical' posts within the Navy,too. Moreover,duringthe reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, policies were put in place striving for an Islamization of public service: putting the newly-founded School of Civil Engineering (1883) under military supervision made it inaccessiblet oO ttoman non-Muslims. This meant that Ottoman non-Muslims (particularlyA rmenians) and foreigners that,t ogetherw ith Ottoman Muslims, staffed the administration of Public Works, weretobegraduallyreplaced by Muslim technicians. In practice, howev- An example is the 1917c ase of the Ottoman authorities' concern over the credentials of Italo Fazanotti. An Italian citizen, Fazanotti applied for the post of engineer in the Istanbul Municipality.A sh is diploma was of the second class,hew as onlyallowed to applyfor the post of assistant-of-the engineer.( BOA, DH.UMVM, file 71,s heet 39, 10F ebruary 1917) er,the demands of the expanding public works administration made this intention inapplicable, as the government proved to give priority to aswift realization of specific projects,rather than to long-term policies, includingthe replacement of non-Muslims with Muslims.
The principle of 'national preference/exclusivity',d efined in terms of Ottoman citizenship and thus includingp eople of all ethno-religious allegiances, shaped the demands of the Ottoman engineers,a lthough they never went so far as to claim that foreignerss hould be excluded from public employment( a principle that,b yt he way, was becomingt he norm in European countries). When freedom of association was established after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the newlycreated Osmanlı Mimarv eMühendis Cemiyeti (OMMC: Society of Ottoman Architects and Engineers) accepted as members all Ottoman citizens who had adiploma from an engineering school in the Empire or abroad, or who wereg enerallyacknowledgeda sengineers for their work. One of the grievances the Society wishedt oh ighlight was the continuingdiscrimination against Ottoman engineers by companies operating in the Empire, as well as the preference Ottoman public institutions (state or municipal) showed regarding foreign experts. It is no coincidencet hat this professional association, whose dealings werec onducted in Ottoman Turkish, accepted onlyO ttoman members (most of them Muslims and Armenians), while the francophone Associationdes ingénieurs et architectes en Turquie was open to all professionals who worked in the Ottoman lands, but whose membership was heavilyskewed towards foreigners of all nationalities and Ottoman Greeks.
Once the Ottoman Empire became integratedi nto European power politics and the structures of global capitalism, and opened up to the influx of foreigners of all nationalities and social strata, it became atrue land of opportunity for European technicians and entrepreneurs. Despitet he growingn umbers and selfconfidenceo fl ocal men trainedi nm odern engineering,f oreignersn ever lost their privileged access to engineering works in the sultan'sd omains. Even constitutional governments that operated under the notion of nationals overeignty preferred their modernizing projects being carried out as quickly and as cheaply as possibletothe enforcing of mid-and long-term policies, such as the creation of local schools and training programs drivenb yt he nationalist principle of kendi ihtiyaçlarımızı kendimiz betaraf etmek: "to cater for our needs ourselves" (Martykánová 2014,p p.143 -144) .
